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UNITED STATES V. JA VINO: RECONSIDERING THE
RELATIONSHIP OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW TO DOMESTIC LAW*
I. INTRODUCTION
A well-established principle of United States jurisprudence is that cus-
tomary international law is a part of our domestic law.' The meaning of
this principle, however, is far from clear.2 Courts and legal scholars have
been unable to agree upon the relationship of customary international law
to other forms of federal law.3 While virtually all scholars agree that, as a
domestic matter, the United States Constitution is supreme over a conflicting
customary international rule of law, 4 no such universal agreement exists for
the notion that a federal statute supersedes an inconsistent international rule
of custom.' Indeed, the controversy over revisions to the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement (Third)) illu-
minates the sharp division of views regarding the status of customary
international law in domestic courts.
6
Despite the ongoing debate among legal scholars, neither the United
States Supreme Court nor any federal court of appeals ever has suggested
that a federal statute may not violate a customary international rule of
* The author gratefully acknowledges the critical insights of Professor Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr. in preparation of this Note.
1. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (standing for general proposition
that customary international law is part of law of United States). See generally Louis Henkin,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MicH. L. Rnv. 1555 (1984) (discussing
proposition that international law is part of United States domestic law).
2. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 1555 (stating that import of principle that international
law is part of United States law is uncertain and controversial).
3. Id. at 1564 (stating that courts have not determined authoritatively relationship of
customary international law to other forms of domestic law in United States); Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-Executing Custom", 81 Am. J. INT'L
L. 371, 371 (1987) (noting disagreement over relationship of international custom to other
forms of domestic law).
4. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HAmv. L. REv. 853, 870 (1987) (maintaining that
history of Supreme Court's approach to treaty law implies that international law, including
customary international law, is subordinate to Constitution).
5. See infra notes 31-76 and accompanying text (addressing debate over whether federal
statute may supersede inconsistent rule of international custom).
6. See Kirgis, supra note 3, at 371 (stating that much heated debate occurred during
drafting of Revised Restatement over whether customary international rule of law could
supersede earlier federal statutory law); infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (providing
example of controversial proposal to Revised Restatement).
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law. 7 Rather, the traditional rule in United States courts has been that, as
a matter of domestic law, courts will uphold a statute that Congress has
enacted in violation of customary international law if congressional intent
is clear.8
A recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, United States v. Javino,9 contains a dictum that challenges this
longstanding rule. In Javino, the United States charged the defendant, Dale
Javino, with the possession of an incendiary bomb made in violation of the
National Firearms Act (Act).' 0 On appeal of his conviction, Javino argued,
inter alia, that the government failed to prove that Javino had manufactured
7. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. Rav. 1071, 1072 (1985) (stating that United States
courts have consistently held that Congress may violate rules of customary international law
at will). But see Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power
and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28
VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 441-42 (1988) (stressing importance of three federal court of claims cases
and two early opinions of Attorney Generals supporting proposition that international custom
must prevail over inconsistent federal statutes). Although Professor Paust correctly notes the
existence of some judicial history in the United States that supports a rule of primacy of
international custom over conflicting federal statutory law, no Supreme Court or federal court
of appeals case law supports such a rule. See infra note 8 and accompanying text (providing
examples supporting traditional rule of primacy of legislation over customary international
law).
8. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 131 (1923) (upholding legislation
that Congress enacted pursuant to Eighteenth Amendment that contravened international
custom permitting ships to carry liquor as part of their stores); Committee of United States
Citizens in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that no enactment
of Congress is subject to challenge on basis of customary international law violation); Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1 lth Cir.) (construing The Paquete Habana to mean that
customary international law will govern only when no controlling executive or legislative act
exists, thus implying that international custom must yield to congressional legislation), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir.)
(holding that even if exercise of jurisdiction under Marijuana on the High Seas Act violated
international law, international law must yield to conflicting federal statute), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 874 (1982); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (construing The Paquete
Habana to mean that courts must recognize congressional or executive acts as superior to
customary international law, and courts have no authority to declare such acts null and void
because acts violate international law), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); The Over the Top,
5 F.2d 838, 842 (D.C. Conn. 1925) (holding that customary international law is binding only
to extent that court adopts it, and such law must give way to congressional will); United States
ex rel. Pfefer v. Bell, 248 F. 992, 995 (D.C.N.Y. 1918) (holding that rules of customary
international law are subject to express acts of Congress, and courts must give effect to
constitutional acts of Congress even if acts violate customary international law); RESTATEMENT
(THnD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF Tm UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (TmnD)] (stating that Congress may supersede earlier rule of international law
if Congress expresses clear intent to do so). In construing statutes courts will presume that
Congress did not intend to violate international law absent a clearly expressed intent to the
contrary. RESTATEMENT (THmD), supra, § 114.
9. 960 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 447 (1992).
10. United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1140 (2d Cir.) (construing various provisions
of National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1988)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 447 (1992).
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the bomb in the United States and that the Act prohibited only the possession
of firearms "made" in the United States. The government, on the other
hand, contended that the Act extended to the construction of firearms
outside of the United States as well.
12
The Second Circuit held that Congress did not express a clear intent to
extend the Act to the foreign manufacture of firearms.13 The Second Circuit
further noted in dictum that even if Congress had expressed in the Act a
clear intent to regulate the manufacture of firearms outside of the United
States, a "substantial question" existed as to whether Congress lawfully
could have done so.' 4 The Javino court explained that in light of sections
402 and 403 of the Restatement (Third), a court likely would rule such
extraterritorial regulation unreasonable. 5 According to the Restatement
(Third), the source of the reasonableness test is customary international
law.' 6 Thus, the Javino court suggested that Congress may not enact a
statute in violation of customary international law.
- Javino is the first federal court of appeals decision to suggest, even in
dictum, that customary international law may override a federal statute as
a matter of United States federal law. The primary focus of this Note is
the resulting change in the relationship between customary international law
and federal statutory law in United States jurisprudence should this dictum
ever become the holding in other cases.
The first section of this Note defines customary internation law and
examines the background of customary international law in United States
courts. Initially, this section distinguishes customary international law from
treaty law and briefly discusses the different approaches that domestic courts
have taken with respect to the two types of international law. This section
then examines the various theories concerning the relationship of domestic
law to international law that have influenced courts in their treatment of
customary international law.
The second section of this Note analyzes the meaning as well as the
jurisprudential implications of the Javino dictum. This section discusses the
question of whether the Second Circuit actually focused on the issue of the
11. Id. at 1141.
12. Id. at 1142.
13. Id. The Javino court noted that a well-established principle of United States law is
the presumption that unless a contrary intent appears, Congress does not intend legislation to
have extraterritorial application. Id. The Second Circuit contrasted the language of the National
Firearms Act (Act) with the clear language mandating extraterritorial application in legislation
prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of controlled substances. Id. The Second Circuit
found no such intention of extraterritorial effect either in the language of the Act or in the
legislative history of the Act. Id. Because the Act did not prohibit the mere possession of an
incendiary device, but rather the possession of a firearm made in violation of some other
provision of the Act, the Javino court upheld the defendant's claim that the government had
failed to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1143.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1142-43.
16. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 403 cmt. a.
1993]
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relationship of federal statutes to customary international law when it stated
its dictum. This section also addresses two possible implications, as well as
related policy matters, should other courts adopt the principles delineated
in the Javino dictum. The first possibility is that courts will deem customary
international law superior to federal statutory law. Another possibility is
that courts will apply the last-in-time rule which currently is applicable only
with respect to treaty law. Finally, this Note questions whether the source
of the Restatement (Third) 's reasonableness test lies in customary inter-
national law or domestic law, and, if so, whether the Restatement (Third)
requires the result that the dictum in Javino appears to articulate.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Customary International Law Defined
International law consists of two principal types of law.' 7 The first type,
treaty or conventional law, refers to obligations that arise out of express
agreements among states. 8 In the United States, the President makes treaties
with foreign nations to which the Senate must give consent in order for
them to become legally binding.' 9 In Reid v. Covert,20 Justice Black an-
17. See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (distinguishing two principal types of
international law). Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists two
other types of international law, both of which are secondary authority. The first of these are
"general principles of law of civilized nations." I.C.J. Stat. Art. 38(1)(c). The key characteristic
of the general principles is that these principles, such as the doctrine of res judicata or statute
of limitations, are common to many of the major legal systems. REsTATEMENT (THmD), supra
note 8, § 102 cmt. 1. Although general principles may lack sufficient acceptance to constitute
a customary international rule of law, such principles are a secondary source of international
law that often develop international law interstitially. Id. Consistent state practice, moreover,
may convert a general principle into a rule of international custom. Id. The second type of
law consists of judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists. I.C.J. Stat. Art.
38(l)(d).
18. See REsTATEmENT (1=), supra note 8, § 102 cmt. f (defining treaty law).
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also REsTATEmENT (TIR), supra note 8, § 303 (defining
types of international agreements President may make). In addition to treaties, which require
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, the President has the authority to enter into three
other general types of international agreements. Id. Under the first type, "Congressional-
Executive agreements," the President, pursuant to the authorization or approval of Congress,
may make an agreement with other states dealing with any matter that falls within the
constitutional powers of the President and Congress. Id. § 303(2). Common examples of
Congressional-Executive agreements involve situations in which congressional legislation requires
an international agreement to execute the legislation, or in which Congress authorizes the
President to conclude an international agreement. Id. § 303 cmt. e. Because a Congressional-
Executive agreement is merely an alternative to concluding a treaty, the agreement has the
same authority in domestic law as a treaty. Id.
A second type of agreement, known as an "executive agreement pursuant to treaty,"
permits the President to make an international agreement that a United States treaty authorizes.
Id. § 303(3). The President uses this type of agreement to implement the treaty, and the
international agreement has the effect and validity of the treaty itself. Id. § 303 cmt. f. The
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nounced the proposition that the Constitution is supreme over treaties and
executive agreements. 2 1 Moreover, Article VI of the United States Consti-
tution provides that treaties, along with federal statutes, are supreme over
any inconsistent state law.2 Generally, treaties are equal in status to federal
statutes,23 and if an inconsistency arises between a federal statute and a
treaty, the "last-in-time" rule governs.u Thus, a treaty will supersede any
final type, "sole executive agreements," involves international agreements that the President
makes pursuant to the President's independent authority under the Constitution. Id. § 303(4).
For instance, the Executive has the authority under its power as commander in chief to make
armistice agreements during declared wars. Id. § 303 cmt. g. Sole executive agreements are
law of the United States and, as with treaties, later congressional acts or treaties may supersede
them. Id. § 303 cmt. j. However, courts have not determined authoritatively whether a sole
executive agreement may override earlier federal statutes as a matter of domestic law. Id.
20. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
21. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-41 (1957) (announcing supremacy of Constitution
over treaty law). In Reid, the Supreme Court considered whether an executive agreement
between the United States and Britain may violate the constitutional rights of American
criminal defendants. Id. at 3. The executive agreement at issue granted the United States
military courts exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Great Britain by U.S.
servicemen or their dependents. Id. at 15. In Reid, Mrs. Covert killed her husband, a sergeant
in the United States Air Force stationed at an airbase in England. Id. at 3. Under the treaty,
Mrs. Covert received a court-martial trial and, despite evidence of insanity, the military tribunal
found her guilty of murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment. Id. The Supreme Court
held that Article III, Section 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution
forbade the nonjury military trial of a civilian. Id. at 15-41. In so doing, the Supreme Court
reversed its prior decision which held that Congress could provide for the military trial of
such civilian dependents provided that the procedures were not arbitrary and were consonant
with due process. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1956). The Reid Court further
rejected that power of Congress "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces" under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 permitted a nonjury military
trial of civilian dependents. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19-40. Accordingly, the Court held that Mrs.
Covert's military conviction violated the Constitution and, therefore, could not stand. Id. at
41.
While Reid involved an executive agreement, courts have established firmly the supremacy
of the Constitution over all international agreenents, whether treaties or sole executive
agreements. See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 13740'(1972) (asserting
that general agreement exists that Constitution is supreme over all international agreements);
REsTATEMENT (I'Hm), supra note 8, § 302, Reporter's Note 1 (same).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI. Article VI of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
23. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (establishing equality of federal
statutes and treaties in domestic legal framework); REsTATEMENT (Tm i), supra note 8, § 115,
Reporter's Note I (stating that courts have inferred that Supremacy Clause establishes equality
of treaties and statutes); infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing equality of congres-
sional acts and treaties in context of last-in-time rule).
24. See RESTATEMENT frmD), supra note 8, § 115 (defining last-in-time rule).
19931
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prior inconsistent federal statute.25 The last-in-time rule only applies, how-
ever, to self-executing treaties-treaties that need no further legislative
enactment in order for courts to apply them as law.
26
The second type of international law, customary international law,
consists of unwritten obligations that courts infer from the general practice
of states-a course of action or inaction that states habitually follow out
of a sense of legal duty. 27 In the United States, customary international law
25. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933) (giving effect to treaty
with Britain that modified earlier congressional act regarding territorial limits of searches of
ships at sea); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
602 (1889) (upholding congressional act controlling immigration in violation of prior treaties
between China and United States); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870)
(upholding Internal Revenue Act imposing taxes on liquor and tobacco in violation of prior
treaty with Cherokee Indian nation); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(upholding congressional act allowing imports contrary to pre-existing United Nations Security
Council trade embargo on Rhodesian exports), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); RESTATEmENT
(Timtn), supra note 8, § 115 (providing definition of last-in-time rule). See generally Henkin,
supra note 4, at 870-72 (discussing history of application of last-in-time rule); M. Erin Kelly,
Comment, Customary International Law in United States Courts, 32 ViiL. L. Rav. 1089, 1092
(1987) (stating last-in-time rule); Paust, supra note 7, at 398-419 (1988) (discussing history of
application and notable exceptions to application of last-in-time rule).
26. RESTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 8, § 111(3) (distinguishing self-executing treaty
from non-self-executing treaty). The Restatement (Third) provides that an international agree-
ment is non-self-executing:
(a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation,
(b) if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires
implementing legislation, or
(c) if implementing legislation is constitutionally required.
Id. § 111(4).
While a non-self-executing treaty is binding legally upon the United States as a matter of
international law, courts may not apply a non-self-executing treaty as a matter of domestic
law. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 1561 n.25 (stating that domestic courts may not apply non-
self-executing treaties because they are not incorporated into domestic law). As such, a non-
self-executing treaty cannot provide a basis for a private lawsuit. See Frolova v. Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that only self-executing
treaties can provide right to sue, and listing factors to consider in determining whether treaty
is self-executing).
27. See Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REv. 665, 669 (1986) (providing definition of customary international law); RESTATE-
MENT (Timw), supra note 8, § 102(2) (same). The Restatement (Third) emphasizes the two
requisite elements before a practice can become binding as customary international law: (I)
the practice must be consistent and general and (2) states must follow the practice out of a
sense of legal duty, or opinio juris sive necessitatis. Id. While members of the international
community need not universally follow a certain practice before it becomes a customary
international rule of law, the general practice should reflect wide acceptance among a significant
number of states that are involved in a relevant activity. Id. § 102 cmt. b. A consistent and
general practice which is limited in scope to only a few states or a particular region can
become a principle of customary international law that binds only those states involved. Id. §
102 cmt. e.
Furthermore, if states which follow the general practice do so only out of courtesy and
not out of a sense of legal obligation, the practice is not binding as customary international
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exists as an independent source of domestic law only as federal common
law.2 Moreover, unlike treaty law, no constitutional provision or Supreme
Court case explicitly addresses the place of custom in the hierarchy of
United States laws. 29 Therefore, whether the last-in-time rule would apply
with respect to customary international law is unclear.30
B. History of Controversy Over Relationship of Customary International
Law to Domestic Law
1. The Meaning of The Paquete Habana
Much of the debate concerning the relationship of customary interna-
tional law to domestic law centers on the meaning of the now-famous
dictum from the Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana:3
law. Id. § 102 cmt. c. Such a practice, which courts and legal scholars often refer to as a
principle of comity, may become binding as law if the states generally begin to believe that
an international legal duty requires such action. Id.
28. See, e.g., RsTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § III cmt. d (supporting view that
customary international law is federal common law); see also infra notes 57-76 and accom-
panying text (addressing debate over characterization of customary international law as federal
common law).
29. See Margaret Hartka, Note, The Role of International Law in Domestic Courts: Will
the Legal Procrastination End?, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 99, 106 (1990) (stating that
Constitution says little about place of customary international law in domestic jurisprudence);
Henkin, supra note 4, at 867-69 (same). But see Jordan J. Paust, Customary International
Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status As Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59,
77-86 (arguing that constitutional basis exists for incorporation of customary international law
into domestic legal framework); infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (suggesting that one
may read well-known passage from The Paquete Habana as addressing place of custom in
hierarchy of United States domestic law). According to Professor Paust, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 10 of the Constitution refers to the "law of nations" and, as such, customary
international law is relevant to the powers of all three branches of government. Paust, supra,
at 77-85. First, customary international law is relevant to the Executive branch's Article II,
Section 3 duty to "take care that Laws be faithfully executed." Id. at 81. Second, customary
international law may serve to limit congressional power in some circumstances, while enhancing
congressional power in other circumstances, such as Congress' power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. Id. at 83-84. Finally, under Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1, the judiciary has the power to discover and apply customary international
law as "the Laws of the United States." Id. at 84. Professor Paust also argues that many of
the amendments to the Constitution, particularly the Ninth Amendment, have their source in
longstanding human rights principles of customary international law. Id. at 80.
30. See infra notes 103-45 and accompanying text (addressing debate over whether courts
may apply last-in-time rule to conflicts between federal statutes and customary international
law).
31. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (establishing international law as law of
United States). In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court considered whether private Spanish
fishing vessels, which the United States captured as prizes of war, were properly subject to
capture. Id. at 686. The owners of the ships argued that, because an ancient custom exempted
such private vessels from capture as prizes of war, the capture was unlawful. Id. at 686. The
Supreme Court considered the history of the doctrine and determined that the rule was binding
as a customary rule of international law. Id. at 686-708. The Supreme Court accordingly held
the capture unlawful and awarded the proceeds of the sale of the vessels to the ships' owners.
Id. at 714.
1993]
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International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations. 32
Some courts and legal scholars have interpreted the phrase "controlling
executive or legislative act" in The Paquete Habana dictum to mean that
if any executive or legislative act applies to the issue at hand, that act
should prevail over international custom without regard to which is later in
time.33 The two leading federal court of appeals opinions that have adopted
this approach are Tag v. Rogers3 4 and Garcia-Mir v. Meese.
35
In Tag, the plaintiff, a German citizen, argued that the Trading with
the Enemy Act, 36 under which his title to a New York trust fund vested in
the Attorney General, violated customary international law.37 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared that federal
courts must recognize an applicable treaty, federal statute, or constitutional
provision as superior to principles of customary international law.3 The
Tag court further explained that the courts have no authority to declare
null and void a federal statute or treaty declaration merely because such
provision violates a principle of customary international law.39
32. Id. at 700. The Supreme Court's basis for its conclusion in The Paquete Habana
dictum was the holding of an earlier case, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894). In Hilton,
the Court stated:
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such quetions is a treaty or
a statute of this country. But when ... there is no written law upon the subject,
the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the
law is .... In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial
decisions [and] ... the acts and usages of civilized nations.
Id. at 163.
33. See infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing judicial cases and opinions
of legal scholars supporting view that The Paquete Habana dictum requires consideration of
customary international law only in complete absence of relevant executive or legislative act).
34. 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
35. 788 F.2d 1446 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
36. 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988)).
37. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1960). In addition to the plaintiff's customary international law claim, he also claimed that
the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and
Germany prevented the United States from lawfully confiscating the plaintiff's property. Id.
at 667. This treaty provided, inter alia, that heirs in either country were entitled to succeed to
property in the other country regardless of the heirs' nationality. Id. The Tag court, applying
the last-in-time rule, held that the Trading with the Enemy Act superseded the prior inconsistent
treaty with Germany. Id. at 667-68.
38. Id. at 668.
39. Id. The Tag court held that, because Congress had enacted the Trading with the
Enemy Act, the court would not apply customary international law and, accordingly, denied
the plaintiff's claim. Id.
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Garcia-Mir involved the detention of two groups of Cuban refugees
under the direction of the Attorney General. 40 The refugees filed suit alleging
violations of the Due Process Clause and customary international law .
4
With respect to their claim that prolonged arbitrary detention violated
customary international law, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit found that a congressional statute allowed the detention
of the "First Group" of refugees and that the Attorney General's act
constituted a "controlling executive act" allowing the detention of the
"Second Group" of refugees. 42 The Eleventh Circuit then construed the
The Paquete Habana dictum to mean that customary international law
controls only in the absence of a treaty or a controlling executive or
legislative act or decision,43 presumably without regard to whether interna-
tional custom or federal law is later in time.
Some scholars have suggested that the language from The Paquete
Habana requires courts to uphold congressional or executive acts over
contrary international customs."4 One argument, for example, maintains that
the essential corollary to the The Paquete Habana rule is that the judicial
and political branches of the United States government have the power,
based upon a federal statute or a controlling executive act, to disregard
40. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1448 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889
(1986). The refugees in Garcia-Mir were a class of Mariel Cuban refugees to whom the United
States accorded a special immigration parol status under the 1980 Refugee Education Assistance
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1522 (West 1988). Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1448. For purposes of this
suit, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia divided the class of
refugees into two subclasses. Id. The "First Group" of Cuban refugees consisted of those
who were guilty of committing crimes in Cuba or those who were mentally incompetent. Id.
The "Second Group" consisted of Cuban refugees who the United States paroled into this
country under the general alien parole statute, but whose parole the government subsequently
revoked. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1453-55.
43. Id. at 1453. Because the court found controlling executive and legislative acts, the
Garcia-Mir court denied the plaintiff's customary international law claim. Id. at 1455. The
court also denied the plaintiffs' claim that the Due Process Clause prevented their arbitrary
detention. Id. at 1449-53.
The "controlling executive act" in Garcia-Mir also raises the related issue of whether the
President can violate customary international law. The issue of the President's power to violate
customary international law also involves a unique constitutional issue: whether the President
must abide by customary international law in fulfilling the Executive's Article II obligation to
faithfully execute all laws of the United States. For a general discussion of this issue, see
Michael J. Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 923 (1986);
Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International
Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321 (1985); Kirgis, supra note
3, at 373-75; Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 377 (1987); Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND.
L. R v. 1205 (1988).
44. See infra notes 45-47 (discussing view that The Paquete Habana stands for proposition
that federal statutory law prevails over inconsistent international custom).
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customary international law. 45 Similarly, Professor Phillip Trimble would
construe the The Paquete Habana dictum as affirming the view that cus-
tomary international law is not of the same status, but rather is inferior to
federal law.4 Accordingly, Professor Trimble asserts that a court should
apply customary international law only pursuant to a clear direction of a
political branch or, alternatively, when the political branches have not
addressed the question and a court's application of customary international
law poses no danger of complicating foreign policy.47
Other legal scholars argue that the language in The Paquete Habana
does not compel courts to apply domestic law over international custom.4
Professor Louis Henkin advances the view that courts should construe the
phrase "controlling executive or legislative act" in the The Paquete Habana
dictum to mean a subsequent executive or congressional act.4 9 A customary
international rule of law, therefore, will govern unless a subsequent federal
statute contravenes the issue. 0 A customary rule of international law would
have essentially the same status as a self-executing treaty and could override
a prior legislative enactment.5 1 Professor Jordan Paust similarly argues that
the language of the dictum in The Paquete Habana is inconclusive and
cannot support the proposition that an applicable federal statute should
override a contrary custom. 52 Professor Paust, for example, states that the
word "controlling" in the dictum is a qualifying word indicating only that
some legislative acts might be controlling whereas others are not. 3 Therefore,
the complete absence of relevant domestic law is not a prerequisite to the
judicial application of customary international law.5 4
45. Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board The Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict
Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143, 145 (1984).
Goldklang argues that if either an executive proclamation or congressional act expressly allowed
for the capture of the Spanish fishing boats in The Paquete Habana, the Court could not
have applied contrary customary international law to the case. Id. at 145-46.
46. Trimble, supra note 27, at 727-31; see also Comment, The Outward Limit of the
Department of Interior's Authority over Submerged Lands-The Effect of Customary Inter-
national Law on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 60 WAsH. L. Ray. 673, 685-95 (1985)
(arguing that courts should regard customary international as inferior to statutory law).
47. Trimble, supra note 27, at 672.
48. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (providing view that The Paquete
Habana does not require absence of controlling executive or legislative act as requisite to
courts applying customary international law).
49. Henkin, supra note 4, at 878. Professor Henkin argues that the clause in The Paquete
Habana stating "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision" was dictum because neither party contended that a relevant United States
law required a contrary result. Id. at 873. The Supreme Court cited no authority for the
qualifying clause and never has elaborated on the meaning of the clause. Id. at 874. Thus,
Henkin suggests that the Court may well have meant that a "controlling" act is a subsequent
act. Id. at 878.
50. Henkin, supra note 4, at 878.
51. Id. at 877-78.
52. Paust, supra note 7, at 435-37.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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However popular the interpretations that Professor Henkin and Profes-
sor Paust espouse, courts simply have not construed the dictum in The
Paquete Habana as requiring any further consideration of customary inter-
national law when an applicable legislative or executive act exists.55 Rather,
judicial decisions reflect the notion that executive and legislative acts are
superior to customary international law in the domestic sphere, and that
such acts always will prevail over an inconsistent rule of custom, regardless
of which is later in time.
5 6
2. The Characterization of Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law
Another area of controversy concerning the status of customary inter-
national law in the United States centers on the characterization of custom-
ary international law as federal common law.57 Given the locus of the rule-
making authority within a democratic government, the legislature may enact
legislation that modifies or completely supersedes any rule of common law,
whether the rule originates before or after the legislative enactment .5 Thus,
55. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text (discussing two leading cases construing
The Paquete Habana dictum).
56. See Trimble, supra note 27, at 684 (stating that United States courts almost never
have applied customary international law as direct restraint on governmental interests); supra
note 8 (providing judicial decisions that reflect idea that federal statutes always prevail over
inconsistent custom in domestic courts). But see Paust, supra note 7, at 439 n.91 (providing
federal court of claims cases implying domestic law may be subordinate to customary inter-
national law).
A possible exception to the rule that congressional and executive acts are always superior
to customary international law in the domestic framework is in the narrow field of peremptory
international norms or jus cogens. See Committee of United States Citizens in Nicar. v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating in dictum that courts recognize existence
of limited class of peremptory norms that prevail over inconsistent statutory law); RESTATEMENT
(Tmsw), supra note 8, § 102 cmt. k (explaining that international community recognizes class
of norms that are peremptory, allowing no derogation); infra notes 135-37 and accompanying
text (discussing peremptory norms in context of debate over whether customary international
law is self-executing). Jus cogens are basic moral norms, such as international human rights
principles, that approximate a theory of international natural law. See David Klein, Comment,
A Theory for the Application of Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic
Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 351-56 (1988) (defining jus cogens). States cannot derogate
from such norms domestically, nor can states acting collectively preempt jus cogens by treaty
law. Id. Jus dispositivum, by contrast, are norms that arise only because of consistent state
practice and acquiescence. Id. at 351. States may abrogate jus dispositivum by treaty law. Id.
Under the traditional United States rule, moreover, Congress is free to violate customary
international law that is in the class of jus dispositivum. Id.
57. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text (addressing debate over characterization
of customary international law as federal common law).
58. See Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrong?, supra note 43, at 923 (stating that
federal common law is interstitial and fills gaps in congressional legislation, but must yield
when Congress enacts inconsistent legislation); Kirgis, supra note 3, at 373 (stating that
legislature may modify or supersede common law). The Supreme Court also has addressed the
issue of the power of federal courts to make common law on a subject upon whicli Congress
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if customary international law is only a part of federal common law, an
international principle of custom never could prevail over an inconsistent
legislative enactment. 9 On the other hand, if customary international law
is an independent source of law that courts discover through use of the
common-law method, then an argument exists that customary international
law, at least under certain circumstances, may override a contrary federal
statute. 60
Professor Henkin is the leading scholar of the view that customary
international law exists as a separate body of law. Professor Henkin asserts
that customary international law, although similar to common law in that
neither are formally promulgated, is not federal common law as such because
judges do not create but, rather, discover principles of international law. 6'
In effect, rules of international custom are binding without any action on
the part of domestic institutions because courts discover a rule that some
exterior source requires them to apply.62 Consequently, constitutional doc-
trines according supremacy to the legislative branch as a rule-making body
do not apply to courts in finding -customary international law. 63
Critics of Henkin's argument point to several weaknesses in his char-
acterization of customary international law as a body of law apart from
federal common law.64 First, while Henkin correctly notes that federal
common law and customary international law are both unwritten law, United
States courts never have held that unwritten federal law is anything but
federal common law.65 Second, according to Henkin's critics, whether courts
"make" or "find" law is irrelevant because courts use the same general
approach when discerning and applying customary international law as with
other common law.6 Courts often discern customary international practice
through judicial decisions of various states. 67 By the same token, the absence
previously has legislated. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625
(1978) (addressing issue of federal courts' power to develop common law on subject upon
which Congress has legislated). The Supreme Court has held that congressional legislation on
a particular matter precludes federal courts from creating an inconsistent common law on the
same matter. Id. While courts generally are free to supplement congressional enactments,
courts may not do so to the extent that such congressional acts become meaningless. Id.
59. See Kirgis, supra note 3, at 373 (suggesting that customary international rule of law,
like other common law, yields to statutes).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63 (discussing argument that customary inter-
national law is independent of federal common law in United States domestic law).
61. Henkin, supra note 4, at 876-77.
62. See Weisburd, supra note 43, at 1237 (characterizing Professor Henkin's position).
63. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 876-77 (stating that traditional arguments supporting
proposition that common law is inferior to legislation do not apply with respect to international
law).
64. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (criticizing Henkin's view of international
custom as body of law independent of federal common law).
65. Kirgis, supra note 3, at 373 n.12.
66. See Klein, supra note 56, at 349-50 (stating that differences in application of
customary international law and common law are not differences of general approach).
67. Id. at 347.
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of judicial precedents on a given issue may compel courts to consult
historical practice and scholarly resources to arrive at a common-law prin-
ciple just as courts do in "finding" customary international law. 68 Therefore,
the only difference in courts' approaches to customary international law
and other federal common law is the availability of precedent.
69
A third criticism of Professor Henkin's view of customary international
law is that domestic law exists only to the extent that a court or a political
institution promulgates the law.70 According to this view, the seminal case
of Erie Railroad v. Tompkinsl stands for the proposition that a rule's
authoritativeness can derive only from a constitutionally empowered source
68. Id.
69. Id. at 350.
70. See Weisburd, supra note 43, at 1237 (criticizing Professor Henkin's view of custom-
ary international law as, per se, binding domestic law).
71. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie R.R. Co. v Tompkins, the Supreme Court reconsidered
the longstanding notion that, with respect to questions of general law, federal courts sitting
in diversity jurisdiction were free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent
judgment as to what the common law of a state is or should be. Id. at 71. The plaintiff,
Harry James Tompkins, suffered serious injury when a door protruding from the defendant's
train struck the plaintiff as he walked adjacent to the defendant's railroad track. Id. at 69.
The plaintiff filed a negligence suit in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id.
The plaintiff argued that because no Pennsylvania statute addressed the issue, the court should
apply federal common law. Id. at 70. The defendant, on the other hand, argued that the court
must apply Pennsylvania common law which held that persons who walk along the railroad
right of way were trespassers and that railroads were not liable for injuries to trespassers
resulting from the railroad's negligence. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York agreed with the plaintiff and entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. Id. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed. Id. at 80. The Court held
that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction were to apply the law of the state, whether
the state law is statutory or common-law in origin. Id. at 79-80. In so holding, Justice Brandeis
made the well known statement that "[there is no federal general common law." Id. at 78.
Thus, Erie ended the belief in the existence of a transcendent unitary form of common law
which applied equally to state, federal, and international jurisdictions. Klein, supra note 56,
at 339.
The affect of Erie on courts' application of customary international law has received
considerable attention in scholarly literature. Early concerns focused on the various problems
should courts construe Erie to require federal courts in diversity cases to follow international
law determinations of state courts. See, e.g., Philip Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v.-
Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INr'L L. 740, 743 (1939) (urging that Erie
should not require federal courts to follow state court determinations of international law).
The courts have embraced Judge Jessup's view of the effect of Erie on customary international
law, and this is no longer an issue. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
425 (1964) (adopting Judge Jessup's view that Erie holding did not apply to international law
determinations); Henkin, supra note 1, at 1558-59 (stating that general agreement now exists
that federal courts, and not state courts, have power to determine customary international law
cases). Thus, courts have accepted the proposition that some room exists for the development
of federal common law. Id. Nevertheless, a debate still exists as to whether Erie ended the
notion that customary international law may be binding as federal common law without any
action on the part of the courts. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing
debate over whether courts must promulgate rules of international custom before such rules
are binding as federal common law).
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that promulgates the rule. 72 Thus, a rule of international law is not binding
in the domestic realm merely because of some external international au-
thority, but only because the court has applied the law.
7 3
The Supreme Court never has addressed squarely the question of whether
customary international law in the domestic realm is federal common law
or some other type of law.74 Nevertheless, if the Supreme Court confronts
the issue, the Court likely would hold that customary international rules of
law that are incorporated into the domestic laws of the United States are
federal common law. Such a holding is consistent with the Court's treatment
of other unwritten federal law.75 Furthermore, a holding that customary
international law is federal common law in the United States does not
disturb the traditional rule that Congress may violate international custom
without regard to whether the statute becomes effective before or after the
custom has emerged.
76
C. Theoretical Impediments to Judicial Application of Customary
International Law
In addition to the history of debate over the relationship of customary
international law to domestic law, several theoretical problems lead to a
general reluctance on the part of the judiciary to apply customary interna-
tional law.77 One such obstacle stems from the prevalence in the United
States of the so-called "dualist" concept of international law. 78 The dualist
72. Weisburd, supra note 43, at 1237.
73. Id. at 1237-38.
74. A debate exists as to whether the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964), stands for the proposition that customary international law is federal
common law. See Weisburd, supra note 43, at 1240-41 (addressing debate over whether
Sabbatino held that customary international law is federal common law). In Sabbatino, the
Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine, which, under certain circumstances, prevents
United States courts from determining the legality of acts of foreign governments, is a matter
of federal common law. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. Professor Weisburd argues that Sabbatino
is, at best, suggestive, but clearly does not hold that international custom is federal common
law. Weisburd, supra note 43, at 1240-41. Others argue that the language in Sabbatino urging
the need for federal supremacy and uniformity in international law interpretations strongly
implies that customary international law is federal common law. E.g., Joan Hartman, "Un-
usual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application
of the Death Penalty, 52 U. Cm.. L. REv. 655, 662 (1983).
75. See supra text accompanying note 65 (stating that no courts have ever held that
unwritten federal law is anything but federal common law).
76. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (stating that if customary international
law is federal common law, Congress may supersede customary international law by statute
whether such custom emerges before or after statute).
77. See infra notes 78-88 (discussing theoretical obstacles to judicial application of
customary international law).
78. See Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 930,
932 (1986) (stating that while Supreme Court never has addressed whether United States legal
system is monist or dualist, Supreme Court has implied, through construction of Supremacy
Clause, that United States is in dualist camp).
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theory maintains that domestic law and international law are two distinct
legal systems. 79 Domestic decisionmakers determine whether to give internal
effect to international law and, if so, what status to give to international
law in the hierarchy of domestic law. 0 The effect of the dualist approach
is that Congress or the President may violate customary international law
without being in violation of domestic law in the United States.8" The
"monist" theory, by contrast, holds that international law and domestic
law are parts of a single legal system and that international law is supreme
in the hierarchy of domestic law. 2 Under the monist approach, a congres-
sional or executive act that violates a rule of customary international law
also results in a violation of domestic law, and courts must give effect to
international law over the contrary domestic law.83
An additional impediment to the courts' application of customary
international law is a general lack of understanding of customary interna-
tional law among United States courts.84 Judges may believe that an inter-
national legal system simply does not exist.8 5 Alternatively, because judges
must first determine whether a customary norm exists before applying the
norm as law, judges may be unwilling to infer that a principle has become
customary law, especially when the principle would be inconsistent with an
earlier congressional or executive act. 6 Judges also may believe that, even
if customary international law exists and is capable of being extrapolated
from the general practice of states, courts nevertheless are ill-equipped to
determine the existence or effect of such law and, consequently, leave such
questions to the political branches.8 7 Thus, at least in practice, courts tend
to relegate international custom to the realm of idealism. 8
79. Henkin, supra note 4, at 864.
80. Id. at 864-65.
81. Id.; cf. Lobel, supra note 7, at 1072-73 (1985) (suggesting that power of Congress
and President to violate international law causes dichotomy between national and international
legal systems).
82. Henkin, supra note 4, at 864.
83. See id. (stating that under monist system, courts must give effect to international
law, notwithstanding contrary provisions in domestic constitution or laws); Richard B. Lillich,
The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9,
12 (1970) (same).
84. See infra notes 84-88 (suggesting that courts lack understanding of customary
international law); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Alien Tort Claims, Sovereign Immunity and
International Law in U.S. Courts, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 326 (1988) (stating that federal
judges typically are not experts in field of international law).
85. Cf. Trimble, supra note 27, at 665-67 (providing views of national leaders concerning
their doubts about international legal system).
86. Henkin, supra note 1, at 1566; see also Note, Judicial Enforcement of International
Law Against the Federal and State Governments, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1269, 1276 (1991)
(explaining that judges are reluctant to find that international custom creates binding obligations
in absence of specific validation by political branch).
87. See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L.J. 2277, 2291 (stating that judicial refusal to entertain international law claims reflects
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III. ANALYSIS
The Javino dictum, 9 which questions the lawfulness of an extraterritorial
regulation within an international context, stands alone in the history of
judicial application of customary international law in the United States.9
The import of the language suggests that a customary international rule of
law, at least in some instances, may impose constraints on congressional or
executive actions. 91 However, the Second Circuit does not address the extent
to which customary international law would limit a federal statute. Thus,
the dictum leaves open to question whether customary international law is
in some sense always superior to congressional law, or whether a court
must uphold only that which is later in time.
Nevertheless, if other jurisdictions adopt the principles underlying the
Javino dictum as the basis of future judicial opinions, these opinions could
change significantly the relationship between international law and acts of
Congress in United States jurisprudence. Specifically, two possible conse-
quences may follow from courts' adopting the Javino dictum as the basis
for holdings in future cases. First, courts eventually may regard customary
international law as superior to other forms of domestic law. A second
possible consequence is that courts may apply the last-in-time rule to
conflicts between customary international law and domestic law.
A. Implications of the Javino Dictum
1. Transformation from a Dualist to a Monist System
The first possible consequence of courts' adopting the Javino dictum
as future holdings is a variation of the "monist" theory of international
concern that foreign policy is political function and that courts are ill-equipped to make such
foreign policy determinations).
88. Cf. Trimble, supra note 27, at 667 (observing that "[i]n the popular view international
law is a charade-governments obey it only if convenient to do so and disregard it whenever
a contrary interest appears.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15 (paraphrasing Javino dictum).
90. Compare Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984)
(applying reasonableness test to extraterritorial application of antitrust legislation), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1032 (1985) with RESTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 8, § 403 (setting forth reasona-
bleness test). Unlike the reasonableness test in the RESTATEMENT (THmD), which purportedly
has its source in customary international law, the Timberlane court neither impicitly nor
expressly held that its reasonableness test emanates from rules of international custom. See
generally Timberlane, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (making no reference to customary
international law). While the Javino court quite possibly may not have focused on the
international law issue as such, the dictum's sole reliance on the RESTATEMENT (THIR) suggests,
by implication at least, that customary international law provides the reasonableness test which
might proscribe the extraterritorial regulation in this case. See United States v. Javino, 960
F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir.) (relying on sections 402 and 403 of RESTATEMENT (TmRD), which
provide that customary international law is source of reasonableness test), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 447 (1992).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (explaining that Javino dictum suggests
that customary international law may limit certain congressional actions).
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law in which courts would deem customary international law superior to
federal statutory law. 92 However, little judicial or scholarly support exists
for this proposition. The suggestion that courts must accord international
custom a higher status than the other forms of law listed in the Supremacy
Clause exists neither in the text of the United States Constitution nor in
the evidence of the Framers' intent.93 As Professor Harold Maier points
out, no legal scholar successfully has shown that the people of the United
States intended to bestow the government's decisionmaking authority subject
to the confines of an international legal regime. 94
Nevertheless, a somewhat persuasive argument exists that neither the
Constitution nor the courts can limit the authority of customary international
law in the United States by relegating custom to a status equivalent to or
lower than that of federal statutory law. 95 According to this view, customary
international law has a superior claim to treaty law because custom is
universal and enduring whereas treaty law governs only the parties to the
agreement and only as long as the agreement remains in effect.96 Indeed,
the constitutions of other countries have embraced the supremacy of cus-
tomary international law over domestic legislationY Some scholars even
assert that common notions about customary international law in the era
of the Constitution's inception suggest that the Framers may have intended
a monist system in which federal statutory law is subordinate to customary
international law.98
92. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (defining monist system). A strict
monist system would subordinate the Constitution to customary international law as well. See
Henkin, supra note 4, at 864 n.56 (noting that one school of monists treat international law
as supreme to all domestic law).
93. Henkin, supra note 4, at 866-67.
94. Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the
United States, 10 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 450, 4 0 (1989); see also Trimble, supra note 27, at 682
(arguing that location of law-making authority beyond American political institutions is
inconsistent with American political philosophy); cf., Goldklang, supra note 45, at 146-47
(maintaining that notion of customary international law superseding constitutional acts is not
compatible with system of representative democracy in United States).
95. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing argument for monist system).
96. Henkin, supra note 4, at 877.
97. See id. at 877 n.101 (discussing constitutions of Italy, Greece and of Federal Republic
of Germany, all of which generally recognize supremacy of customary international law over
domestic legislation); Antonio La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, International
Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 601 (1985) (explaining that
incorporation of customary international law is common to constitutions of European states).
98. See Henkin, supra note 78, at 933 (asserting that plausible arguments exist that
Framers intended customary international law to be of higher status in hierarchy of domestic
laws than congressional acts); Lobel, supra note 7, at 1078 (arguing that American Revolu-
tionary leadership strongly supported notion that fundamental principles of international law
limited government's power). Professor Lobel asserts that the Framers believed that domestic
law and international law were simply two different branches of natural law. Lobel, supra
note 7, at 1078-79. Furthermore, notions of the English common law in that period reflected
the belief that universal principles were at the foundation of common law and the law of the
nations. Id. at 1081-83. Thus, the Framers accepted the notion that the universal principles
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If the Supreme Court ever addresses the issue, however, the Court
would not likely give effect to a rule of customary international law without
regard to constitutional constraints.99 Rather, given the status of customary
international law in the international realm 1°° and the role of treaty law
under the Constitution, 0' the Court likely would place customary interna-
tional on the same level in the hierarchy of United States laws as treaty
law.' 2
2. Application of the Last-in-Time Rule to Customary International
Law
A second implication of courts' adopting the Javino dictum as the basis
for future decisions is that courts will apply the last-in-time rule applicable
to treaty law to customary international law. Indeed, application of the
last-in-time rule is a more likely possibility than a judicial transformation
into a monist system. 103 Although Congress still could enact legislation in
violation of customary international law, the rule would require a court to
determine which is later in time in deciding to give one law effect over
another104 Moreover, considerable support exists in legal literature for the
proposition that courts should apply the last-in-time rule to conflicts between
domestic and international law.105
Professor Henkin, for instance, argues that no reason exists to prevent
the application of the last-in-time rule to customary international law.?
6
Henkin maintains that treaties and custom are of equal authority in the
international realm and that custom will override a prior contrary treaty if
embodied in customary international law were supreme to municipal law and provided a limit
to governments' authority. Id.
99. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 869-70 (stating that Supreme Court likely would
subordinate customary international law to Constitution).
100. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 1564 (stating that customary international law and
treaty law have same status in international realm).
101. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing supremacy of Constitution over
treaty law).
102. See Henkin, supra note 78, at 933 (stating that courts likely will conclude that
customary international law has status of treaty law in hierarchy of domestic laws). An arguable
exception to a rule placing customary international law and treaty law on the same plane
would be in the narrow field of peremptory norms. See supra note 56 (discussing possible
exception for peremptory norms). The Supreme Court likely would provide that peremptory
norms, such as international human rights law, override legislation that violates a peremptory
norm of international law. See supra note 56 (observing that courts recognize peremptory
norms that prevail over inconsistent statutory law).
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (suggesting that transformation into
monist system is unlikely because of lack of constitutional support).
104. See Henkin, supra note 4, at 1566 (stating that, as with treaty law, Congress may
supersede customary international law for domestic purposes, but that courts may give effect
to customary international law in face of earlier statute).
105. See infra notes 106-10 (stating view that courts should apply last-in-time rule to
unavoidable clashes between international custom and federal statutory law).
106. Henkin, supra note 1, at 1564-65.
UNITED STA TES v. JA VINO
the parties so intend. 1°7 Because treaties are equal in status to federal
statutes, 0 8 customary international law also should be equal in status to
federal statutes.' °9 Therefore, courts should apply similar rules with respect
to both forms of international law."10
While significant similarities exist between the two types of international
law,"' customary international law is, by its very nature, inescapably dif-
ferent from treaty law." 2 As a consequence, courts could not apply the last-
in-time rule to customary law in the same manner as courts do with respect
to treaty law."' Legal literature on this issue reveals several considerations
107. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIR), supra note 8, introductory note, pt. V (providing
example of international custom superseding prior inconsistent treaty). A good example of
customary international law overriding a prior inconsistent treaty in the international realm is
in the law of the sea. REsTATEmENT (ThuD), supra note 8, Introductory Note, pt. V. The
conventions which the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference adopted in 1958 have
never terminated. Id. However, much state practice exists reflecting provisions of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea that is inconsistent with the 1958 conventions. Id. Although
the 1982 Convention has not yet entered into force, states generally have accepted most of
the substantive provisions of the 1982 Conventions as rules of customary law binding upon
them independent of the Convention. Id. But see CLIVE PARRY, Tim SoURcES AND EVDENCES
OF INTERNATiONAL LAW 33-37 (1965) (stating that treaty law is more authoritative than
customary law); Trimble, supra note 27, at 669 (arguing that customary international law and
treaty law cannot be equally authoritative because they do not rest on same political founda-
tions).
108. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing equality of treaties and federal
statutes).
109. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 1565 (arguing that no authority nor reason in principle
exists for giving less weight to rules of customary international law than to treaty law in
relation to prior congressional enactment).
110. Id. But see Goldklang, supra note 45, at 148-49 (arguing that whether customary
international law will supersede treaty law in international realm is doubtful and, even if
custom can supersede treaty in international law, whether such rule would apply in domestic
law is doubtful). Goldklang points out that the REsTATEmENT (TaItr) contains no convincing
authority supporting the assertion that customary law would supersede a prior treaty in
international law. Id. at 148 n.30. However, assuming that the international law recognized
the last-in-time rule with respect to custom, the United States' legal hierarchy is not particularly
conducive to the application of the last-in-time rule to customary international law. Id. at 149.
111. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 1565 (noting similarities between customary international
law and treaty law). As Professor Henkin points out, customary international law, like treaty
law, is a multilateral creation of the political processes of the members of the international
community. Id. Indeed, a principle of international custom is essentially a tacit agreement
among states. Id. Furthermore, in the United States, an infraction of either type of international
law (for instance, a court upholding a federal statute over a conflicting international law under
the last-in-time rule) may give rise to international responsibility for the United States. See
RESTATEMENT (Trinu), supra note 8, § 115 cmt. b (stating that, although Congress may
supersede rule of international custom, international legal obligation continues).
112. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (differentiating between nature of
treaty law and customary international law).
113. See Trimble, supra note 27, at 676-82 (suggesting that because of fundamental
differences between treaty law and customary international law, courts could not apply last-
in-time rule to conflicts between federal statutes and custom in same fashion as they could to
conflicts between statutes and treaties).
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that courts should take into account in deciding whether to apply the last-
in-time rule to customary international law."
4
First, an argument exists that the application of the last-in-time rule to
conflicts between federal statutes and international custom would be, in
essence, a transformation into a monist system." 5 The basis of this argument
is that customary international law will always necessarily be later in time
because consistent state practice and recognition continually re-enacts a
customary international principle.116 If state practice does not constantly
reenact a rule of international custom, the custom loses its force as law."
7
Because a valid rule of custom always would be last in time and always
would prevail over inconsistent statutes, customary international law must
be paramount to federal statutory law." 8
The basis of this argument, however, is an improper characterization
of customary international law. Although the existence of consistent state
practice and legal obligation is necessary to the continued validity and force
of an international custom," 9 it does not follow that such state practice
constantly re-enacts customary international law, nor that the date of
purported re-enactment is the relevant point in time. Rather, the relevant
point in time, at least for purposes of the last-in-time rule, is the point
when the norm initially emerges as a rule of customary international law.'20
Therefore, the application of the last-in-time rule to clashes between inter-
national custom and domestic law is not the equivalent of a transformation
into a monist system.
A second consideration is that, in light of the widely held belief that
customary international law is a part of federal common law, the application
of the last-in-time rule to customary international principles might require
the courts or Congress to recognize a difference between principles of
international custom and other federal common law.12 ' Because application
of the last-in-time rule would permit a customary international rule of law
to modify or supersede a prior statute, a principle inconsistent with notions
of a democratic government, 22 a need may arise to redefine customary
114. See infra notes 115-45 and accompanying text (explaining variables that affect
application of last-in-time rule to conflicts between customary international law and federal
statutes).
115. Cf. Paust, supra note 7, at 418 (arguing that last-in-time rule applied to conflicts
between international custom and federal statutory law supports primacy of customary inter-




119. See supra note 27 (discussing requirements for international norm to be rule of
customary international law).
120. Cf. RESTATEmENT (Trmw), supra note 8, § 102 cmt. c (suggesting that relevant point
in time is when states begin to follow practice out of legal obligation or opinio juris).
121. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text (describing debate over characterization
of customary international law as federal common law).
122. See Goldklang, supra note 45, at 147 n.20 (arguing that system of representative
democracy in United States allows last-in-time rule only for acts that have same constitutional
status, such as statutory law and treaty law).
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international law as a sort of independent law that courts must find and
interpret.
A related argument that courts eventually may have to address is that
according customary international law a status equivalent to treaty law will
upset the constitutional framework for the balance of powers.123 Professor
Trimble, for instance, asserts that courts are neither constitutionally em-
powered nor properly equipped to make the foreign policy determinations
that customary international law embodies. 124 Rather, permitting courts to
apply customary international law to invalidate legislation or otherwise to
limit the authority of the political branches essentially grants to courts the
same power to use international law as the power of courts to use consti-
tutional law as a check on government authority.'2s Unlike a court's appli-
cation of treaty law-law which popularly elected officials have made-a
court's application of customary international law would impose upon the
people a norm that they had no voice in making through the political
processes. 26 Such a result would cause a significant redistribution of political
powers and create a threat to the fundamental majoritarian philosophy of
a democratic government. 27
Critics of Trimble's view counter that the courts' application of custom-
ary international law does not present the threat of redistribution of political
powers that he anticipates.'2 First, according to Trimble's critics, courts
are sufficiently equipped to ascertain and apply customary international
law. 29 Second, Trimble's critics argue that both the countermajoritarian
problem as well as the distinction between treaty law and international
custom are exaggerations because customary law arises through state consent
and the political processes of the various states. 30 The fact that many
123. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (discussing argument that courts using
customary international rule of law as check on governmental power will upset balance of
powers).
124. Trimble, supra note 27, at 709-16.
125. See id. at 684 (stating that judicial application of customary international law to
limit congressional acts will elevate status of international custom to constitutional common
law).
126. Id. at 727-28.
127. Id. at 678-84.
128. See Klein, supra note 56, at 362 (suggesting that courts' application of customary
international law would not redistribute political power any more than common-law adjudi-
cations already do). Klein argues that although Congress never has had the authority to violate
fundamental customary norms, for example, a court's acknowledgement of this fact would
not cause a redistribution of powers within the domestic constitutional framework. Id. at 363.
129. See Kelly, supra note 25, at 1125-26 (arguing that courts are equipped to ascertaih
existence of customary international law and should apply controlling norms to contribute to
enforcement and development of international law); Note, supra note 86, at 1279 (stating that
just as common-law courts are capable of giving content to broad constitutional doctrines of
Due Process and Equal Protection, courts are equipped to give specific content to vague
concepts of customary international legal principles).
130. See Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 2310 (stating that to extent that customary inter-
national law arises through state consent, custom poses no more of countermajoritarian threat
than treaty law).
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international norms are evidenced in treaties and other international agree-
ments also tends to undermine any concern of excessive judicial activism.'
Thus, the application of the last-in-time rule to conflicts between interna-
tional custom and congressional acts would not cause a significant reorgan-
ization of governmental powers and the concomitant threat to democracy.
Nevertheless, if domestic courts actively begin to discern and apply rules of
customary international law, courts will have a broader role in making
domestic law than traditionally has been the case in our legal framework.
The constitutionality and propriety of such practice undoubtedly will come
into question.
An additional problem with the theory that courts should apply the
last-in-time rule in every case involving an unavoidable conflict between
international custom and a federal statute is that the argument necessarily
assumes that custom is always self-executing.1 2 Although Professor Henkin
argues that customary law is self-executing and courts may apply such law
without need for further congressional enactment or implementation, 33 other
scholars maintain that some types of norms may not be self-executing.'3
Professor Frederic Kirgis, for instance, asserts that certain rules of customary
international law, such as human rights principles prohibiting torture, need
no implementing legislation before courts may apply such law.' This is so
because the norms are specific and the international community universally
recognizes that these principles vest basic rights in every individual. 3 6 One
could fairly characterize these norms as self-executing. 37 On the other hand,
international norms involving highly politicized issues, such as norms re-
garding territorial limits, likely would require further implementing legisla-
tion for domestic courts to apply them as customary international law. 3
Furthermore, assuming that courts could surmount the jurisprudential
obstacles to applying the last-in-time rule to customary international law,
131. Cf. Kelly, supra note 25, at 1122 (stating that one response to Professor Trimble's
argument that customary international law has weaker political foundation than treaty law
and cannot be equally authoritative is that statutes or treaties often evidence international
custom).
132. See Kirgis, supra note 3, at 372 (suggesting that as last-in-time rule applies only with
respect to self-executing treaties, any argument that last-in-time rule should apply to every
conflict between federal statutes and international custom presupposes that custom is self-
executing).
133. Henkin, supra note 1, at 1561.
134. See infra notes 135-38 (differentiating between self-executing and non-self-executing
rules of customary international law).
135. Kirgis, supra note 3, at 372-73; see also Klein, supra note 56, at 350-56 (explaining
that norms involving fundamental human rights are self-executing). Early international theory,
drawing heavily on natural law theory, made a distinction between international practices that
were jus cogens and those that were jus dispositivum. See supra note 56 (distinguishing jus
cogens from jus dispositivum). In contemporary theory, Klein asserts, the classifications aid
in distinguishing a self-executing from a non-self-executing rule of customary international
law. Klein, supra note 56, at 356.
136. Kirgis, supra note 3, at 372.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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many practical problems may arise ofit of the rule's implementation.'3 9 First,
courts would confront considerable difficulty in determining the existence
of a rule of customary international law.'40 Second, as a result of the
amorphous nature of customary international law, courts would face extreme
difficulty in determining the critically important moment in time when a
customary international rule of law changes or initially emerges.' 4' Indeed,
because international custom evolves gradually over time, no precise moment
of inception may exist.' 42 Federal statutes would be subject continually to
a judicial determination that customary international law had changed or
emerged after the statutory enactment.' 43 Furthermore, longstanding inter-
national customs would never have primacy over later congressional enact-
ments. 44 The net effect of the last-in-time rule applied to custom is that
the status of federal statutory law vis-a-vis international custom would be
subject to continual uncertainty.
145
The application of the last-in-time rule to unavoidable conflicts between
customary international law and federal statutory law is neither impossible
nor without support in legal literature. Nevertheless, such treatment of
customary international law undoubtedly will require a re-evaluation of the
characteristics of international legal principles. Furthermore, according in-
ternational custom such status certainly will require courts to become
increasingly adept at finding and applying such law.
In sum, the preceding analysis suggests that if courts adopt the principles
underlying the Javino dictum as the holding in other cases, courts eventually
may have to decide upon one of two possible approaches to customary
international law, either of which substantially would alter the traditional
judicial approach to customary international law. Because of the Javino
dictum's sole reliance on sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Third)
139. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing practical problems in
application of last-in-time rule to conflicts between international custom and congressional
legislation).
140. See ANroY CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 181 (1986) (arguing
that unavailability of enormous body of evidence makes ascertaining existence of newly emerged
customary rule of international law exceedingly difficult).
141. See Maier, supra note 94, at 470 (observing difficulty in determination of precise
point in time when customary international rule of law evolves).
142. See Note, supra note 86, at 1276 (explaining that customary international principles




145. Id.; see also Trimble, supra note 27, at 684 (discussing confusion of applying last-
in-time rule to customary international law). Professor Trimble hypothesizes a "bouncing ball
effect" in which a customary international rule of law supersedes existing legislation. Congress
subsequently may re-enact the superseded legislation to give it effect over the customary rule.
Id. Years later, however, an activist court might find that the customary international rule of
law had re-emerged and superseded the re-enacted legislation. Id. This "bouncing ball effect,"
Trimble argues, could continue indefinitely. Id.
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and the importance of the principles 'that underlie those sections, an ex-
amination of the position of the Restatement is relevant to the analysis.
B. The Position of the Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third), which the American Law Institute (ALI)
adopted in 1987, does not state a clear position with respect to the status
of customary international law in relation to other forms of domestic law.146
However, in drafting the current Restatement, the Reporters thoroughly
considered and, indeed, adopted a provision that essentially accorded cus-
tomary international law a status equivalent to treaties in United States
law.1 47 Specifically, section 135(1) of Tentative Draft No. 1 of the Restate-
ment provided that a newly emerged principle of customary international
law would supersede an inconsistent, pre-existing congressional statute.'4
The Reporters conceded, however, that the courts had not authoritatively
determined this proposition1 49 and, after considerable controversy, the Re-
porters abandoned section 135.150 The only vestige of section 135 that
remains in the Restatement (Third) is a suggestion in Reporter's Note (4)
of section 115 that, arguably, courts should give later customary interna-
tional law effect over an earlier statute."'
Although the Restatement (Third) leaves intact the traditional notion
that Congress may violate customary international law, the Restatement
(Third) nevertheless asserts that a new rule of customary international law
has emerged that may proscribe certain congressional acts.5 2 Section 403
provides that an international principle of reasonableness of extraterritorial
jurisdiction has emerged which may limit the authority of Congress to
regulate affairs beyond United States borders in some circumstances.'
146. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8 (evincing no clear statement on
relationship of customary international law to domestic law).
147. RESTATEMENT (THrD), supra note 8, § 135 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 135 cmt. b.
150. See Maier, supra note 94, at 471 (noting that Reporters removed section 135 after
much controversy).
151. RESTATEMENT (TimD), supra note 8, § 115 Reporter's Note 4.
152. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
153. Id. According to § 403, even when a state has a basis under § 402 for exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction, a state may not exercise such jurisdiction when it would be
unreasonable to do so. Id. § 403(1). In determining whether the exercise of such jurisdiction
is unreasonable, a court must consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
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Under the Restatement (Third) approach, courts will not interpret general
language in a statute to extend beyond what the reasonableness test would
allow.'15 4
The Restatement (Third)'s reasonableness test has generated considerable
controversy. 5 5 The practical aspect of the debate centers on whether the
judiciary is the proper forum to engage in the interest balancing and foreign
policy determinations that the reasonableness test requires. 5 6 Some scholarly
literature'" and judicial opinions"' reflect the idea that the political branches,
and not the courts, should decide such matters. The jurisprudential aspect
of the debate focuses on whether the reasonableness test really has support
in customary international law or domestic law. 19 An argument exists that
the source of the reasonableness test is not in customary international law160
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2).
154. Id.
155. See Brilmayer, supra note 87, at 2288 (stating that RESTATEMENT reasonableness test
has provoked much controversy) ; infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (discussing debate
over reasonableness test).
156. See Trimble, supra note 27, at 704 (arguing that courts are not properly equipped
and are institutionally unsuited to engage in interests balancing). But see Brilmayer, supra note
87, at 2288 (suggesting that courts are equipped to use international law to resolve questions
of extraterritorial scope). Apart from the question of whether the judiciary is the appropriate
branch to balance the interests of competing states, another problem concerns the practicality
of any domestic branch of government applying an all-encompassing balancing test. See Karl
M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
783, 802 (1984) (questioning propriety of balancing test). One author has suggested that while
a balancing test may be suitable for resolving questions of conflict of laws in the domestic
context, the balancing test may not be appropriate in the international framework. Id. In
international law, domestic decisionmakers must make reference to how the multitude of states
perceive reasonableness of an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. Id. In applying the
reasonableness test, a domestic court of one state likely may reach a different conclusion than
a domestic court of another. Id.
157. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 27, at 704-06 (arguing that issues of extraterritorial
regulation reflect fundamental economic, social, and political differences among states and
that such issue is political one, ill-suited for judiciary).
158. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-
56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that courts should not engage in interest balancing and criticizing
appropriateness of reasonableness test).
159. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text (addressing issue of whether reason-
ableness test has its basis in international custom or domestic law).
160. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950 (stating that no evidence exists that balancing
test represents rule of customary international law); Harold G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial
1993]
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but, rather, that the drafters extracted the reasonableness test from inter-
national principles of comity'6' and elevated the test to the status of
customary international law. 62 Furthermore, some scholars have suggested
that the reasonableness test is without support in domestic law and that,
indeed, many courts flatly have rejected the test. 63
Regardless of whether the Restatement (Third) correctly states a current
rule of international custom or domestic law, courts nevertheless may believe
that the Restatement (Third) rules are authoritative and, as Professor
Trimble asserts, the rules could become self-fulfilling prophecies.'64 Whether
courts base their decisions on a supposed or actual rule of customary
international law would seem to make little difference in the ultimate effect
on the relationship of customary international law to domestic law in United
States courts. As the Javino dictum clearly suggests, courts may construe
and adopt a Restatement rule to invalidate legislation that purportedly
violates a principle of customary international law. Once case law firmly
establishes a limit that customary international law imposes on congressional
authority, courts likely will face the difficult questions regarding the rela-
tionship of international custom to domestic law.' 65
The preceding argument assumes that the Javino court correctly inter-
preted the position of the Restatement (Third). A closer analysis, however,
Conflicts, or "There and Back Again", 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 9-10 (1984) (stating that prior
to original draft of § 403, little, if any, support in international law suggested customary
international principle of reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
161. Compare RESTATEMENT (THnR) supra note 8, § 403 (providing reasonableness test
based on customary international law) with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)] (providing rule for
jurisdictional conflicts on basis of international principles of comity). See generally Maier,
supra note 160 (discussing journey of ALI Reporters from comity principles underlying
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 40 to customary international law principles underlying RESTATEMENT
(Tsmo) § 403). Professor Maier asserts that in spite of the Reporters' apparent rejection of
the principles of comity in the RESTATEMENT (TaD), most of the authority for the § 403
reasonableness test consists of United States cases in which courts have balanced competing
state interests to ascertain whether the comity principle suggested a restraint of the extrater-
ritorial application of regulatory legislation. Id. at 9; see also Trimble, supra note 27, at 698
(stating that courts that have engaged in interest balancing generally have not framed analysis
in terms of international law, but in terms of comity, congressional intent, or to precedent
and RESTATEMENT rules).
162. See Trimble, supra note 27, at 702 (stating that Draft REsTATEMENT elevates balancing
test to status of customary international law).
163. Id. But see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)
(holding that courts should apply balancing test to determine whether interests of United States
are sufficiently strong in relation to those of other states to justify assertion of extraterritorial
authority). Professor Trimble argues that the problem with the Timberlane line of cases is that
most courts have rejected this approach. Trimble, supra note 27, at 702.
164. Trimble, supra note 27, at 678. Professor Trimble nqtes that courts often rely on
the Restatements for authoritative statements of rules of law. See id. at 678 n.54 (providing
examples of cases relying on RESTATEMENT rules).
165. See supra notes 57-145 and accompanying text (addressing controversial issues with
respect to relationship of customary international law to domestic law).
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reveals that the Javino court misconstrued the Restatement (Third) when it
suggested that Congress may not have the authority to enact a statute in
violation of the customary international law of reasonableness. 166 The Re-
statement (Third)'s position falls short of requiring courts to refuse to give
effect to a clear statutory command because the act violates the customary
international law of reasonableness. 67 The black letter rule of section 403
states that courts should not interpret general language in a statute to extend
beyond the limits of the reasonableness test. 6s However, if congressional
intent is clear, courts must give effect to that intent even if such a
construction results in a violation of international law. 69 Thus, the Restate-
ment (Third) does not require the result that the dictum in Javino suggests . 70
Nevertheless, the judiciary, and not the ALI, is the institution that
creates the common law.' 7 ' Even though a court might interpret a Restate-
ment rule incorrectly, the court's interpretation may become firmly en-
trenched in judicial precedent. Thus, if a subsequent court adopts the Javino
court's interpretation of sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Third)
as a basis of a judicial opinion, the law of at least one jurisdiction will
require any extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction to conform with the
customary international law of reasonableness before giving effect to the
statute. Of course, the implications of adopting such a rule of law extend
far beyond questions of jurisdictional limitations, and courts likely will face
the difficult and more fundamental questions regarding the relationship of
customary international law to domestic law. 72
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the significant consequences of adopting the approach that
the Javino dictum suggests as well as the Javino court's failure to elaborate
166. Compare United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir.) (suggesting that
court may not uphold congressional enactment that violates customary international law of
reasonableness), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 447 (1992) with RESTATEMENT (THaRD), supra note 8,
§ 403 cmt. g (stating that courts must give effect to clear intent of Congress despite violation
of customary international law).
167. See REsTATEMENT (TmD), supra note 8, § 403, cmt. g (stating that act of Congress
is valid even though construction of statute that accommodates congressional intent within
confines of international law is not fairly possible).
168. Id.
169. Id. Professor Maier states that the original versions of § 403 appeared to challenge
the traditional notion that, when congressional intent was clear, courts must give effect to that
intent even if such effect would violate international law. Maer, supra note 94, at 466. After
much controversy, however, the Reporters made clear that § 403 did not require courts to
refuse to give effect to clear statutory commands. Id. In effect, Professor Maier argues, the
current § 403 returned to the "functional comity principle" of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §
40 without using the term. Id. at 468.
170. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (explaining that Javino court miscon-
strued rule of REsTATEMrNT (TBIRD)).
171. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 276-77 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that common law
comprises body of rules which derive their authority from judgments and decrees of courts).
172. See supra notes 57-145 and accompanying text (addressing difficult questions con-
cerning relationship of domestic law to customary international law).
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upon its interpretation of Restatement (Third), section 403, the court most
likely was not mindful of the underlying customary international law issue.
Nevertheless, the Javino dictum suggests a landmark judicial position on
the relationship of customary international law to domestic law. If judicial
opinions ever reflect the principles underlying the Javino dictum, the deci-
sionmakers of this country undoubtedly will face difficult and controversial
questions concerning the status of customary international law and how
courts should integrate that body of law into the existing domestic legal
framework.
Future courts should be wary of adopting a customary international
rule of law as a limitation on congressional power without giving full
consideration both to the numerous consequences as well as to the propriety
of the judicial application of customary international law in this fashion.
As this Note suggests, the most likely result of such an approach would be
the eventual recognition of customary international law as equivalent in
authority to treaty law in the domestic realm and the application of the
last-in-time rule to unavoidable conflicts between federal statutory law and
international custom. While application of the last-in-time rule to custom
appears workable, courts should be prepared to confront the inevitable
practical and jurisprudential difficulties should judicial precedent ever sup-
port the application of customary international law as a limitation on
domestic governmental authority.
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